Plei Trap Valley - Major Detours

A standard abatis could not be obtained, as the dead trees were unlikely to stay connected to the stumps, and as there were no thick leafy boughs to provide an interlocking effect. However, the large mass of each individual tree, coupled with the slope of the road, would complicate removal. The original plan called for felling the trees south or downhill of the pass, but it was decided to fell the trees north of the pass. This provided larger trees and also put the abatis on the uphill side for enemy removal, thus forcing NVA repair parties to fight gravity.

Upon closing the road, the 4th Infantry Division began a continuing system of reconnaissance to detect attempts to repair or bypass the route. After the original Plei Trap Road was closed, the NVA made minor attempts to repair some bridges and remove smaller trees across the road. By mid-January 1969, no further efforts were apparent, and most bridge and ford sites were still unusable in April. The major abatis remained blocking the chokepoint. Although there was evidence of some foot traffic along the road, a major detour wee forced upon the enemy.

By early February, one of these detours appeared to have traffic bypassing the Plei Trap Road to the east. An operation was begun near the end of February to destroy this detour. Infantry units seized two l half ton trucks loaded with ammunition and rice. One was lifted out by helicopter for closer study. Five more trucks were later captured and destroyed, as were two 106-miUimater, towed Chinese Communist howitzer - era, apparently relics of World War II.

Through the end of the operation in early April, there were indication that other trucks bad been trapped between the 1st and 2d Brigades of the 4th Division. Artillery and air strikes were employed extensively on sightings, but the heavy foliage in the area prevented confirmation of destruction of more trucks than the seven physically seized.

The Plei Trap Road closing provides a good example of a two-nation combined-army operation. Meet of the branches represented in the division played vital roles. The contribution of both the ARVN and US Air Force were essential to the success of the operation.

Injuries were few and minor despite the extremely dangerous locale and the high pressures of the operation. The NVA did not react soon enough to affect the road closure. The rugged terrain and rapid execution of the operation undoubtedly provided a safety factor. A major fight in this area would have posed difficult problems for United States and ARVN forces, whereas the NVA were only hundreds of yards from the sanctuary of the Cambodian border.

Judging from the frantic efforts of the NVA in constructing new vehicle roads, the closing of the Plei Trap Road caused the enemy a major supply and transport problem in the Central Highlands.